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I. INTRODUCTION
The economics of science is a curious enterprise. Few economists and fewer
scientists know of it. The use of economic ideas in the study of science was
pioneered not by economists but by philosophers and sociologists. Even among
economic methodologists, approaches informed by economic ideas remain rela-
tively rare. (Who exactly, John Davis once asked me, is the audience for this
stuﬀ?) And, to the extent that the economics of science can be said to have an
intellectual home, it resides in science studies, a ﬁeld populated by scholars as
poorly disposed to market economies as they are to contemporary economic
thought. So perhaps it is ﬁtting that Science Bought and Sold is itself a curious
enterprise.
Mirowski and Sent’s anthology is the ﬁrst to gather and reprint papers under
the rubric, ‘‘economics of science.’’ Though sprinkled with the contributions of
science-studies stalwarts such as Steve Fuller and Michel Callon, the volume
ﬁrst and foremost collects ‘‘classic’’ articles in the economics of science—Kenneth
Arrow, Robert Nelson, Partha Dasgupta and Paul David, Philip Kitcher, and
Michael Polanyi among them. The anthology is correct enough to include the
prescient Charles Sanders Peirce paper, ‘‘On the Theory of the Economy of
Research’’ (1879), unearthed by Jim Wible.
But wait. What are the ‘‘classic’’ economics of science papers doing in this
volume? Didn’t the editors convene a 1997 conference entitled The Need for a
New Economics of Science before anyone knew there was an old economics of
science in need of replacement? And isn’t the economics of science of all ages—
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several leading statements of which are reprinted here—the same literature that
Mirowski and Sent, in their introduction as elsewhere, vigorously criticize as
wrongheaded? Well, yes. One blurber calls this arrangement ‘‘balance,’’ but the
eﬀect is more one of incongruity. The incongruity is enough to make one wonder
if this is the bookthe editors set out to publish. On the other hand, the editors’
method—establishing a canon so as to attackit—is oddly right. For, as Allan
Walstad has observed, if the economics of science can even be judged a coherent
body of thought, its critics, Mirowski and Sent among them, have been the ﬁrst
to notice. And therein lies a tale, a tale of how fundamental changes in the way
in that scholars regard science has come to inﬂuence the theory and practice of
the history of economics.
II. WHICH ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE?
The editors, you will know, are economists who do intellectual history inspired
by the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge. This wide-ranging expertise informs
their ﬁne introductory essay, which runs to short monograph length, and the
framing of the six sections into which the nineteen papers (which I will not
attempt to individually summarize) are collected. The title makes clear that you
are not holding a handbook. And Science Bought and Sold is not a really a
conference volume—the reprints outnumber the conference papers—nor is it a
reader, exactly. So what is it? Ultimately, it is an assemblage of papers on quite
diﬀerent topics: science policy, scientiﬁc motivation, scientiﬁc practices, scientiﬁc
knowledge, intellectual property, and science studies itself, especially the eco-
nomics corner of it.
The enriching beneﬁts of this broad canvas come at the inevitable cost of some
infelicities. The editors sometimes imply, for example, that the economics of
science is laissez-faire with respect to science policy—it preaches don’t worry, be
happy. But, of course, Arrow’s 1962 paper on the allocation of resources for
invention, reprinted in part two, is a landmarkprecisely because it is neoclassical
and not laissez-faire: Arrow treats scientiﬁc knowledge as a durable public good,
and he argues that this market failure requires non-market solutions.
Elsewhere, we are told (p. 30) that the increasing commercialization of U. S.
universities, which is real enough (and assumed to be a Bad Thing), has arisen
because university administrators are in thrall to the economics-of-science take
on science as a market process. Not only is this notion implausible on its face,
it would be unfair were it true, since economics of science scholars have
been among the ﬁrst to propose replacing the old pure-science/applied-science
dichotomy with one that emphasizes the diﬀerence in the incentive structures of
academic science and industrial science, and emphasizes their fragility (as do
Dasgupta and David, expurgated in part three).
While it is a pleasant fantasy to imagine university provosts reading in
economics of science, the more likely culprit is the lure of proﬁt from markets
hugely expanded by technological change. Universities were once happy to let
professors privately appropriate the returns to publishing their lecture notes as
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interconnection, webbed lecture notes—indeed webbed lectures—are a proﬁt
center worth ﬁghting over. (David Noble’s paper casts as villain the technology
itself, rather than the unseemly scramble for technology-created rents.) However
one judges these trends, they are not caused by the economics of science. Harvard
Law School did not get an injunction that enjoined Arthur Miller from peddling
his Con Law lectures elsewhere on grounds that the academy should be a
commerce-free zone. It was, rather, an old-fashioned tussle over who gets the
rents from commerce.
And the old ‘‘marketplace of ideas’’ warhorse is trotted out for a good
ﬂogging, though I have yet to encounter a serious proponent of the notion, and
the editors can’t ﬁnd anyone either.
No one denies that scientiﬁc claims sometimes compete, and few deny that
scientiﬁc competition is ordinarily wholesome. What is found objectionable is
the marketplace-of-ideas claim that rivalry among ideas leads to ‘‘truth,’’ that is,
that the epistemologically superior theory will ultimately win out. But to identify
this marketplace-of-ideas chestnut with the economics of science is to confuse
truth production with preference satisfaction. Economics does not claim that
functioning markets produce substantive outcomes, only that they produce what
consumers want. It is an open question as to whether ‘‘consumers’’ of scientiﬁc
knowledge always want the truth—the truth can be inconvenient, even career-
threatening, and the very success of science hangs on the extent to which its
institutional structure promotes the production of uncomfortable, funding-
threatening truths.
These commonplace solecisms in Science Bought and Sold will irritate the
specialist, but they are comparatively small beer. The bigger prize is the grandly
conceived historical narrative that uniﬁes the volume’s disparate papers by
conceiving of them as landmarks along the way. The editors’ introduction, which
functions as a kind of raw-footage trailer for Mirowski’s extraordinary feature,
Machine Dreams, sketches the narrative.
The narrative goes like this: the exigencies of Cold-War American science
decisively shape both the natural sciences and neoclassical economics—shape
them in tandem, no less—and, moreover, this heretofore secret history can also
explain the history of the halting and various attempts to use economic ideas in
the study of science. This is an audaciously ambitious thesis for which I commend
the editors. I’m not convinced of its last component—that the size and scope of
Pentagon Big Science has determined the trajectory of the economics of science
literature—but no matter. Mirowski and Sent are after bigger game.
III. THE DIFFERENT ICONOCLASMS OF ECONOMICS AND
SOCIOLOGY
Some background will be useful, not least because of the unacknowledged
centrality of the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge to the editors’ method and to
their appraisal of the economics of science. Mirowski (2001) has described
science studies of the last century as consisting of two strains: (1) the economics
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the view that science is unfathomably mysterious, so best leave it to the priests.
This is a bit like saying that Cold War geopolitics were dominated by two great
powers, the Soviet Union and ... Portugal. The economics of science (Portugal)
is, in fact, a latecomer to the science studies derby, and is still a poor cousin.
And the received-view notion that the study of science is a matter of foundational
philosophy propounded by armchair law-givers (Soviet Union) expired mid-to-
late twentieth century. The death of the received view may not be the end of
history, but we are all naturalizers now—that is, those who study science believe
that the study of science should itself be scientiﬁc, in particular that the empirical
strategies of science should be used in study of science.
The missing great power in Mirowski’s summary of science studies is the
sociology of science, and its cognates in history and anthropology of science—
the very hegemon that dominates science studies and that most informs Mirowski
and Sent’s method and appraisal. I’m not sure why Mirowski, no shrinking
violet he, is so demure on the origins of his own thought. But give Mirowski
and Sent credit, they reprint a Paul Forman article that, once translated from
the Postmodern, argues that the contours of the sociology of science can also be
explained by something like the editors’ grand historical narrative.
Motive to one side, I argue that the economics of science and the sociology of
science have enough in common that critiques of economics apply with equal
(or greater) force to sociology. And, where the economics of science and the
sociology of science part company, the sociology of science runs into fundamental
epistemological diﬃculties of the kind that have given rise to what the newspapers
call the Science Wars. Let me suggest why I thinkit matters for history of
economics.
The economics of science and the sociology of science are both iconoclastic;
they both attackthe traditional image of science as a unique social realm. Both
approaches, for example, treat scientists not as disinterested truth seekers but as
worldly, interested actors. But from here, economics and sociology attackvery
diﬀerent idols, disagreeing most profoundly on the consequences, for scientiﬁc
knowledge especially, of a more realistic conception of scientiﬁc motivation. (A
more scholarly discussion is available in Leonard 2002.)
The economics of science treats the process by which scientiﬁc knowledge is
created as a market process, that is, as one where scientists respond to (pecuniary
and non-pecuniary) incentives that promote (or hinder) the creation of scientiﬁc
knowledge. Science retains its epistemological distinction, but economics depicts
the process of producing scientiﬁc knowledge as no less partisan, grubby and
shallow than the market processes that produce breakfast cereals or broadcast
television. Natural scientists are less aristocratic in their attitude toward markets
than is the humanities professoriate but, let’s face it, the economists’ portrait of
scientiﬁc motivation is less ﬂattering than the traditional image of selﬂess truth
seeking.
The sociologists’ leveling move is, remarkably, even more radical. Science
studies denies science its epistemological distinction by denying that empirical
evidence plays any substantive role in science. Science Studies epistemology
asserts that non-evidential considerations determine entirely which among rival
theories will prevail, as they determine the criteria by which one theory is judgedREVIEW ESSAY 119
better than another. Reason and empirical evidence are, goes the claim, utterly
toothless—they serve only to rhetorically pretty up the means by which dominant
in-groups come to prevail in science. For compactness, let us call Science Studies
epistemology the Position.
If the Position sounds radically skeptical, it is. (If it sounds somewhat familiar,
it is that, too—the notion that empirical evidence does not aﬀect what scientists
believe merely substitutes a credo of ‘‘it’s all social’’ for the ‘‘it’s all natural’’
position of received-view philosophy of science). Students of science have long
known that social inﬂuences matter. Even Cold War-era sociology of science
acknowledged indirect eﬀects on scientiﬁc knowledge from social inﬂuences such
as research project selection. Funding and the opportunity to publish can clearly
aﬀect the prospects for obtaining evidential support, as Brockand Durlauf note
in their contribution. The issue is not whether non-evidential considerations
aﬀect scientiﬁc knowledge (what science studies, per the Position, calls scientiﬁc
‘‘content’’), but how, and to what extent.
But the Position treats ‘‘science as social’’ as an argument-ending claim in
epistemology, not as a Kuhnian mandate to inquire into how the social character
of science promotes or undermines knowledge. Science studies no longer believes,
as Thomas Kuhn did, that ‘‘observation and experience can and must drastically
restrict the range of admissible scientiﬁc belief, else there would be no science’’
(1962, p. 4). And, as a result, science studies regards contributor John Ziman’s
argument as moot: ‘‘The key point is that market-like mechanisms at various
points in the academic research process facilitate the operation of the Mertonian
norms, and thus keep the whole system open, ﬂexible, progressive, relatively
impartial, and self critical... . [T]he nature of the knowledge produced by this
system is closely bound up with its social structure’’ (p. 323).
So the economics of science says to the exact scientists—you scientists are no
diﬀerent and no better than we are. If your product is superior, it only because:
(1) exact sciences are easier than inexact sciences such as economics, and or
(2) you face more virtuous incentives, which promote epistemologically better
outcomes. The sociologist of science says to the exact scientists—your product is
no diﬀerent and no better than ours. Since, per the Position, scientiﬁc knowledge
does not exist, your product cannot be superior to ours, and the need to consider
how social factors inﬂuence knowledge production is obviated. Which do you,
dear reader, regard as the worse slander?
IV. WHY SHOULD HISTORIANS CARE?
Why does this fundamental epistemological disagreement between economists
and sociologists matter for historians? Three reasons. First, it puts into context
Mirowski and Sent’s historical sketch of the economics of science. The editors’
introduction argues that economists wishing to consider science were caught in
a fourfold intellectual bind: economists suﬀered from physics envy; their work
was scorned as unscientiﬁc by physical scientists; the use of economic ideas in
science studies leads to paradoxes of self-reference, and economics has little to
add on matters of truth and cognition. These factors, whether or not they120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
usefully describe the history of the economics of science, are plausible enough.
They also are plausible when applied to the known alternatives in science studies.
Substitute ‘‘sociology’’ for ‘‘economics’’ in the sentence above, and it reads even
better.
In fact, professional envy to one side, it is the sociologists and fellow travelers
in science studies who have most run afoul of the physics establishment—witness
the dumping of Bruno Latour’s appointment to the faculty of The Institute for
Advanced Study. Moreover, whatever physical scientists thinkof economics, their
contempt for science studies comes not from a beef with invisible-hand reasoning
or with the idea that scientists are people, too. The scientists’ contempt for
science studies, I would argue, comes from a deep aversion to the epistemological
position that science studies takes. Physicists may not know from Adam Smith,
but they do know that they regard the epistemological status of their scientiﬁc
claims—make that, laws—in ways profoundly diﬀerent than does the Position.
Second, this is why the editors are, I think, misguided when they pooh-pooh
the so-called Science Wars, as exempliﬁed by the Sokal Hoax, which the editors
dismiss in a footnote. I agree with Mirowski and Sent that the Science Wars have
produced more heat than light, and that Sokal’s success has wrongly been used
to indict the whole of science studies. But the origins of the Science Wars have
their roots in the same fundamental epistemological disagreement.
For those who did not read the newspapers in the late 1990s, an NYU physicist
named Alan Sokal submitted to the journal Social Text a preposterously
incoherent paper (1996) full of howlers, but one with an ideologically correct
line. The bogus paper, was, of course, accepted. Sokal’s goal was not to send up
the gobbledy-gookobscurantism that ﬁlls such journals, nor even was it to
expose the intellectual dishonesty of editors willing to publish errant gibberish.
Sokal, with all the earnestness we might expect from an expatriate Sandinista
school teacher, thought he was saving the Left from the relativist perils of the
Position. How can the Left remake capitalism, Sokal wondered, if our epistemo-
logy denies to us the reason and evidence that we require to make our case?
Sokal’s argument is that the Position is self-destructive. Why bother with a
mountain of empirical evidence oﬀered to support the thesis that empirical
evidence cannot explain what people take to be true? The position is self-
destructive because it is everywhere destructive. It undermines the capitalist and
the socialist argument alike, just as it undermines the history of science—
empirical claims about what has happened—and science alike.
Third, though harder to see, because it has been bundled into a larger and
mostly persuasive historiographic critique of traditional history of economic
thought, the Position has been exported to the history of economics. Some of
our leading scholars—Roy Weintraub and Margaret Schabas among them—
argue that bad old history of thought will remain moribund unless it conducts
historical research that is, well, more like what real historians do. Out with all
the ideological axe-grinding, and the Whiggish business of constructing lines of
intellectual descent, and in with writing histories that better situate ideas in the
personal, social and intellectual contexts in which they were created. Well, yes.
These historiographic injunctions are unobjectionable, even laudable. The ideaREVIEW ESSAY 121
that historical writing should be thicker, richer ... and creamier, can be called
Betty Crocker historiography.
But this critique of traditional history of economic thought ordinarily bundles
these wholesome historiographic injunctions with a claim that historians should
also embrace science studies epistemology. Sokal’s lament, which I share, is that
critical perspectives on the history and organization of science (and, for that
matter, on the organization of the economy and economics) not only don’t
require the Position—they cannot go forward when burdened with the Position.
If all claims about the world (how it is or how it was) really are epistemologically
indistinguishable, why should anyone entertain, for example, the compelling new
workthat connects the history of economics to Cold War science imperatives?
Making Betty Crocker assume the Position thus can do real harm. It can lead
historians of science, for example, to thinkthat their historical narratives must
ﬁnd a usable past for science studies epistemology, which makes debunking the
pretensions to knowledge the paramount aim. History as debunking is, of course,
a venerable practice. But if, in the paradoxical name of the Position, we invest
too much in detailing what science (or economics) is not, we can lose sight of
what science (or economics) is. The centrality of debunking in science studies,
required by the Position, may help explain why, as the sociologist Stephen Cole
(1992) argues, the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge, even taken on its own
epistemological terms, has not succeeded in providing an account of the social
causes of belief.
Don’t get me wrong. History of economics needs its Mirowskis and Sents, and
not just for their excellent work, but in the sense that better history will nearly
always result in a kind of debunking; the overturning of received wisdom
practically follows. But debunking should be a byproduct of good history of
science, not the whole project of history of science. The same Position that
requires historians to make debunking central, also requires their readers to treat
these histories as bunk.
Thus, I argue, does a fundamental epistemological disagreement help explain
historiographic diﬀerences among historians of science and economics. It also
helps explain why this anthology’s papers seem less balanced than awkwardly
juxtaposed. The economics of science and the sociology of science have much in
common but, because the latter assumes the Position and the former does not,
they can seem to be talking about entirely diﬀerent things. This is not an illusion,
nor a rhetorical eﬀect—diﬀerent theories of knowledge will aﬀect how one treats
the knowledge production business.
The epistemological divide may even shed light on the history of economics
boom in the study of mid-century information science, cybernetics, and the
eﬀects of Pentagon science funding, a boom to which the editors have contributed
greatly. Why are historians and sociologists drawn to cybernetics? It could be, of
course, that John Von Neumann fathered both cybernetics and neoclassical
economics, and that the former explains the latter, full stop. But Andrew
Pickering, a leading science studies scholar, admits to a more, well, social
inﬂuence. Pickering is drawn to cybernetics because it is a place where the
scientists themselves seemed to adopt, or at least move closer to, a kind of
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As such, ‘‘the history of cybernetics can help us to breakstill further away
from the representational idiom,’’ by which Pickering means, break further away
from the idea that science is ‘‘an epistemological project aimed at knowledge
production’’ (2002, p. 10). Thinkthat scientists are never really persuaded by the
evidence? Well, here’s some, er, evidence that suggests the players themselves
might have been led—by their science, mind you, not by some philosopher in a
beret—to share the debunking aims of the Position.
This new line of inquiry is fascinating, original, and important. But the same
Position that might have motivated the inquiry will not permit its conclusions.
For the conclusions are impossible by the Position’s own lights: you can’t ask
history of science to provide evidence for a theory of science when that theory
of science argues that evidence is bunk. If it were true, as a historical matter that
cyberneticists moved toward a kind of science studies epistemology—the same
science studies epistemology precludes taking it seriously. This should be an
unacceptable bargain. Shouldn’t it?
I am quite sympathetic to Jeﬀ Biddle’s (2001) proposal, in this journal,
that historians of economics—tired of epistemology, neologisms, and prolix
‘‘theorization’’—call a moratorium on debate over how scholars should treat
scientiﬁc knowledge, and let partisans of the Position show what they can do, as
historians. Then, by its fruits, Biddle suggests, we shall know it. But, the Position
rules out even this modest proposal: for the Position insists that by history’s
fruits we shall know nothing. Why not, instead, stop assuming the Position, and
free our histories, critical and other, to go forward?
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